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   Dividend policy is one of the earliest topics in finance research and is still a 
much-debated topic over the last five decades. As the literatures indicate, dividend 
policy is not only affected by corporate financial characteristics, but also affected by 
the internal corporate governance merits from the micro-level. Recently, as further 
development of the principal - agent theory, the meso-level external market power is 
also an important factor. Moreover, as shown by international comparative 
corporation governance literatures, the macro-level institution like investor protection 
law and its implement system is also another important factor to influence the 
dividend policy of listed company.  
 Meanwhile, dividend policy can be regarded as one kind of institutional 
arrangements made by the listed companies under Chinese special institutional 
background and corporate governance structure. Optimal dividend policy is good for 
further development of the corporation as well as to maximize the corporate values. 
However, in recently years, as the study goes deeper, more and more evidences shows 
that dividend policy is becoming the channel for ultimate controlling shareholders to 
occupy the minor shareholders. Since the equity are not tradable, ultimate controlling 
shareholders can not gain profits directly from stock market. They have to redound 
themselves by some abnormal dividend policies, such as irrational dividend pay-out, 
vicious cash dividend and ultra-ability cash dividends, which have infringed the rights 
and interests of the other shareholders. Making further study on the fundamental 
factors of dividend policy, promoting methods to prevent the embezzlement of 
ultimate control shareholder, strengthening the consciousness of the listed company to 
redound upon the shareholders, inducting the dividend distribution of listed company 
rationally, and protecting the rights of minor investors have become the prevailing 
topics of the Chinese stock marketing research.  
    Despite of the overwhelming importance of dividend policy, systemic study is 
still rare so far. The existing literatures just emphasize one specific factor, which can’t 
converge to an integrated and applicable analytical framework theoretically and lacks  
of religious empirical research design as well as full and accurate empirical evidences. 
    This dissertation, taking consideration of China-specific institutional background 













framework of the dividend policy based on theories of property rights and corporate 
governance. Under this structure, we survey on the dividend literatures home and 
abroad, and we analyze the impact of ultimate property rights characters and its 
control rights structure, the products marketing competition, investor protection laws 
and its implement efficiency, the regional law standard, etc, on Chinese listed 
company’s dividend policy. Using samples from listed company of Chinese stock 
market, we test the relationship among property rights, corporate governance and 
dividend policy from the micro-, meso- and macro-level, which corresponding to 
self-help, medium and judicial protection. This dissertation divides into seven parts as 
follows: 
Chapter one briefly introduces the issues, content, framework of this 
dissertation as well as its contribution and innovation to research in this area. 
    Chapter two puts forward the analytic framework of dividend policy based on 
property rights and corporate governance theories, traces the origins and surveys on 
the dividend literatures under our framework, which points out that the micro-, meso- 
and macro- level institutional arrangements are the main factors to influence dividend 
policies. 
Chapter three investigates Chinese listed company’s ultimate property rights 
ownership and its correspondent control rights structure from the micro level, and also 
research on whether they can influence the dividend policy of Chinese listed 
company. 
 Chapter four tests the product market competition’s influence on dividend policy 
from the meso-level. Based on the sample of Chinese listed company from 2004 to 
2007, we study whether the market competition can influence the possibility for 
Chinese listed company to pay dividend and how much if they pay. 
Chapter five examines whether investor protection laws and its justice system can 
influence the dividend policy of listed company from the macro level. Based on the 
fact that the macro institutions have time serial changes and regional differences in 
one country, we study whether the improvement of investor protection laws and the 
aggrandizement of law enforcement can lead to the optimal dividend payment of 
listed companies. 
Chapter six analyzes the interaction and cross influences between corporate 













Concretely speaking, we controls the influences of fund embezzlement by ultimate 
controlling shareholders and further exam the relationship among corporate 
governance, investor protection and dividend policy.  
Chapter seven summarizes the research results and draws conclusions, also 
points out the limitations of this article as well as future areas of the research. 
The main conclusions of this article are as follows: 
Firstly, almost 80% of Chinese listed companies are controlled by SASAC 
（State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission）, regional SASAC and 
individuals. Listed companies with stated owned ultimate property rights occupy 
almost two thirds of all, while that with private ultimate property rights are just over 
one fourth. The ultimate controlling shareholders need to hold 38.88% shares 
averagely to control the listed company. Few of them adopt the cross listing or flat 
controlling rights structures. They mainly adopt the vertical controlling rights 
structure to control the listed company. 
  Secondly, the characters of ultimate property rights and its corresponding 
ownership structure have impacts on dividend policies indeed. Specifically speaking, 
listed companies with stated own ultimate property rights have lower dividend 
possibility and payment level than those with private ultimate property rights. The 
controlling rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder is higher, the dividend 
payment is obviously higher. And the cash flow rights, the discrepancy degree of 
ownership and control, the controlling hierarchy as well as the numbers of controlling 
chain have influenced the dividend policy of listed company in different ways. 
Thirdly, the external corporate governance mechanism influences the dividend 
policy of Chinese listed company. The relationship between product market 
competition and dividend policy grows negatively. As the investor protection law 
becomes weaker and the law implement efficiency becomes higher, the possibility and 
level of dividend payment becomes higher. The regional law also influences the 
dividend policy in some circumstances, but it is not the essential factor comparing to 
the investor protection level and law enforcement efficiency. 
Fourthly, listed company may set down the dividend policy only after taking the 
fund embezzlement degree of ultimate controlling shareholders into account. 
Infringement of the rights and interests of minor stockholders by ultimate controlling 













of weaker investor law protection and low implement efficiency. Ultimate controlling 
shareholders’preference to fund embezzlement or dividend policy depends on periods 
of time and regions. 
The above points demonstrate that our dividend policy analytic framework based 
on property rights and corporate governance theories is feasible and applicable, and 
they also substantiate that the dividend policy of Chinese listed company is influenced 
by ultimate controlling shareholders and their preference, by control rights structures 
and exterior product marketing competition as well as investor protection law system, 
etc. 
Different from the existing literature, this article has some improvement as well 
as innovations. The main points are listed as follows: 
In the literature review, this paper is the first one to systematically survey on the 
dividend under the unique framework based on property rights and corporate 
governance theories. Different from existing literatures, this paper integrates the 
voluminous dividend literature on the basis of agency cost theory from micro, meso, 
and macro level, which shows the evolvement route of the dividend literature clearly. 
In the theoretical analyses, this paper is the first one to put forward the 
relationship framework of property rights protection, corporate governance and 
dividend policy, which was inspired from the four-level social analysis framework 
created by Williamson. This analysis frame work shows the essence nature of 
corporate governance, and it reveals all possible dimensions of corporate 
governance’s influence on dividend policy. 
In the empirical study, this paper is the first one to test the relationship between 
corporate governance and dividend policy systematically using the sample datum in 
single country, which has provided the good evidence to empirical dividend literature 
from China.  
First of all, the angles of view on ultimate property rights and product marketing 
competition this paper used provides novel ideas to improve the supervision 
efficiency of Chinese listed company and strengthens the listed company’s 
consciousness to rebound the shareholders.  
Second, there is no study on the relationship between dividend policy and market 
power of China so far. This paper tests the corporate governance’s effect of product 













which supplemented the literature with new evidence from China.  
Third, there is still no research investigating the influence of law enforcement 
efficiency as well as investor protection on Chinese listed company’s dividend policy. 
This paper does especially considering the law enforcement efficiency as well, which 
provides meaningful evidence to the research of the dividend policy and “Law and 
Finance”.  
Fourth, the existing literatures do not further study the effect of exterior and 
interior corporate governance mechanism on divided policy, and they have not seized 
the influence of other tunnels like fund embezzlement, which was successfully and 
clearly done in this paper. Furthermore, traditional OLS regressions can’t glean all 
possible influences by other latent variables. By using panel data model, we try to 
control them and let the coefficient estimation be more precise.  
The main limitation of this paper is that we need more robust tests due to our 
lacking of other substituted proxy for the investor protection and law enforcement 
efficiency. Further study is to find a better proxy. Moreover, the newly study is 
beginning to emphasize on culture influence to dividend policy. The relationship of 
culture and dividend policy will become the hot topic of future theoretical and 
empirical study. 
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